The world has become unimaginably dependent on digital communication. At the heart of this almost invisible global network are submarine cables, thick fiber optic strands that connect continents, enabling instantaneous communication and massive data transfers. But is this vital infrastructure, laid at depths of up to 4,000 meters below the surface, vulnerable to threats that go beyond simple accidental breakdowns? The answer, unfortunately, is a resounding yes, and the threat is far more complex than is often thought.
The submarine cable network is the backbone of the intercontinental internet. More than one million kilometers of cable, a system managed by private companies, allow millions of people (and governments) to communicate in real time, conduct financial transactions, or access global information. The disruption of these cables, even temporarily, has catastrophic consequences for the economy and society. Imagine the impact of cutting communications between continents. Such isolation could paralyze supply chains, disrupt the operation of financial markets, and leave millions without access to vital information.
Last February, news resonated among cybersecurity and geopolitical experts: an article published in the Chinese journal Mechanical Engineering described a new tool capable of cutting submarine cables in deep waters. While researchers presented it as a breakthrough in marine exploration, others perceived it as a threat. The underlying fear is understandable. Are there malicious intentions behind the development of this technology?
Recent history is full of worrying precedents. The cable cuts in the Baltic Sea and off the island of Taiwan, which were not satisfactorily explained, sparked a wave of speculation and suspicion that they could be part of deliberate actions. These acts of sabotage or "psychological warfare" could, in the current context, have consequences far beyond the loss of communications.
The question is not whether the technology exists, but whether there is the will to use it. The dilemma is crucial. What happens if a state actor decides to use this technology to affect an adversary, jeopardizing the flow of global information? The economic and social impact would be so great that the possibility of a global conflict, even if not military, becomes tangible.
The companies that manage and maintain these cables must consider the need for reinforcement, for a backup system that allows them to operate alternatively, but this takes colossal time and resources. The idea of a global backup for submarine communications is almost unthinkable in terms of investment and implementation time.
In this context, the concept of national security, and even global security, takes on new meaning. A major power cannot afford to rely on such a vulnerable communications system, exposed to deliberate disruptions. Reliance on submarine cables creates a critical vulnerability in critical information, financial, and defense operations.
The responsibility is multiple. Governments must work to ensure the security of this critical infrastructure, promote international cooperation to prevent sabotage and violence, and explore alternative solutions, such as space- or ground-based communications systems. But this is not a sprint; it is a long-term endeavor and requires close cooperation from the international community.
Ultimately, the question is not whether submarine cables are in danger, but whether we are prepared to defend this vital infrastructure and avoid a "cold war" based on control of global communications. Time and decisive action by world powers will tell the answer. Dependence on this technology is not something of the future; it is something of the present.
It is a risk that is there, and we must be aware of it.
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